In Polish political theory, there is a hypothesis that centuries without a nation-state and a history under foreign rule have led Poles to distrust large civilizational, cultural, economic, military, or political blocs. Due to their geopolitical situation – people living in one vast, open plain without any natural protection – Poles often sought protection from one great power against another.
This protection was never free, which developed a historical and political reflex of distrust towards security promises from major ‘players,’ whether it was the Soviet Union, Europe, Russia, or America.
Scientists have termed this phenomenon ‘post-traumatic sovereignty,’ using it to describe deep political and social tensions as well as a sense of collective anxiety carried by the burden of autonomy, self-determination, independence, and everything that statehood imposes.
In today’s political scene in Poland, this anxiety is reflected in the need, or as we’ve mentioned, the political reflex for Poles – as an independent nation – to align themselves with one of the two current blocs to protect themselves from the aggressive tendencies of the other bloc.
One extreme of this debate is represented and advocated by Jarosław Kaczyński, founder and president of the Law and Justice party and former prime minister, who argues that aligning with either the east (Russia) or the west (Europe) poses an equal danger to Poles, and that the country should distance itself from both blocs.
Moreover, supporters of this current believe that the EU represents nothing more than an agent of German national and foreign policy, making it the greatest threat to Polish national interest and security, or certainly greater than Moscow.
On the other side is the idea supported by Donald Tusk, former and current prime minister and former president of the European Council, who believes that Germany as a threat is a thing of the past while the Ukrainian crisis has shown that the outline of the Russian boot marching from the east is reappearing. Therefore, according to this idea, Poles must turn to the west, particularly Europe, to find refuge and mitigate the risks from fears that history has inspired in them.
In simple terms, Poles today are arguing about which aggressor has inflicted more injuries on them, so they can run to the other one for protection, accepting the role of victim in an attempt to extract the best benefit from their traumatic experience, i.e., avoid even bigger beatings.
They behave post-traumatically in an attempt to be independent.
A somewhat brutal, perhaps exaggerated, but certainly interesting allegory that attempts to describe the history, current state, and fate of a society. An allegory over which an outside observer can have nothing but pity and empathy.
Unless you’re an observer from Bosnia and Herzegovina, in which case you should get chills from the frightening similarities affecting this no less traumatized and tension-torn society.
Try for a moment, even if you disagree with this allegory, to at least attempt to map this perspective onto Bosnia and Herzegovina’s reality; you’ll see some, at the very least, ghostly phenomena that truly appear and act traumatically, perhaps even post-traumatically.
To begin with, instead of two, we have three sides to the debate here, each representing a more or less consolidated ethno-nationalist bloc, each with its own version of history, cultural heritage, religion, holidays, and dream of sovereignty – all those things that characterize a national entity. Ghost number one.
Furthermore, each of these three blocs, or at least the chosen leaders who articulate the fears and aspirations of their respective peoples, has their own vision of whom to align with and how to protect themselves from traumas suffered earlier. The Serbian bloc sees salvation in Belgrade and believes that’s the only sensible place to seek refuge from the misery that has befallen them in recent decades, although the other two blocs see Belgrade as the greatest threat to vital national interest or even survival, taught by traumatic experiences of precisely the last few decades. Ghost number two.
The Croatian bloc, similar to the first one, looks to Zagreb where it sees comfort, guidance, and escape from the prison they’ve been thrown into – whether Federal or state – they themselves no longer know which weighs more heavily on them. And while they see salvation in Zagreb, the darkest shadow of evil that has befallen their people falls on the Serbian bloc from Zagreb’s direction. Bosniaks are, at the very least, distrustful regarding Zagreb. Ghost number three.
Finally, the Bosniak bloc, equally wary of both Belgrade and Zagreb, tries to find relief for its traumatized spirit and traumas in international actors such as the OHR, EU office, US embassy, or some other deus ex machina archetype. This bloc sees the protection of its sovereign aspirations in interventionism coming from Brussels, Washington, Berlin, or some other metropolis.
From which again the Serbian and to some extent the Croatian bloc experience their greatest fears and whose lessons continue to hurt them, producing traumatic reactions. Ghost number four.
To this parade of ghosts, we should add the final one: that none of the three blocs or political factions that define processes in Bosnia and Herzegovina sees in it itself – its institutions, laws, services, or bodies – the capacity to protect not only the specific national interest of each of the three national blocs but also the general description of sovereignty that should grace every state.
The focal point of sovereignty for each of the significant actors in Bosnia and Herzegovina’s political and social debate lies – outside Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The Final Ghost.
It’s a sad picture of a society where everyone is guided by their fears and, in the need to protect themselves, all individually flee in different directions which are, each in themselves, a source of fears for all other members of society.
Well, we’ll easily handle our own ghosts – we’ve had worse – but what shall we do about the traumatized Poles?
